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STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES
THOMAS O'CONNELL HOLSTEIN*
On December 8, 1970, the General Assembly of the United Nations
adopted Finland's resolution requesting the International Law Commis-
sion to "take up the study of the law of the non-navigational uses of inter-
national watercourses with a view to its progressive development and
codification."' The Commission agreed to undertake the investigation
upon receipt of the Secretariat's supplementary report.2 Due to its Agenda,
several years may elapse before the Commission produces a draft conven-
tion on the subject.
In 1972 the Commission stressed the urgency and complexity of the
pollution problem, and requested the Secretariat to make special reference
to pollution in its report. The area of non-navigational uses, as generally
defined, is rampant with problems similar to those encountered at the un-
successful Hague Conference of 1930,4 since it includes state responsibility
for exterritorial injury caused by the pollution of international rivers.
5
This observation leads to the main theme of this article-that the Com-
mission should include state responsibility for pollution in its codification
of general state responsibility, and limit its codification of international
watercourses to specific non-navigational uses. Pollution is not a use, but
the result of use. Dealing with both subjects under the same topic can
only hamper the Commission's codification effort, and would lead to un-
necessary duplication.
For twenty years the International Law Commission has sought
elusively to codify the law of state responsibility. 6 Its unsuccessful attempts
concentrate on state responsibility for injuries to aliens within state ter-
ritory. 7 The work of the Commission from 1954-1962, does not render
much help to determine the responsibility of a state for action within its
territory which causes injury in another State.' The Commission neglected
*B.A., University of Notre Dame; J.D., De Paul University College of Law;
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this problem except in the area of guerrilla activities.9 It so emphasized
the rights of aliens injured within state territory that the Commission's
work during this period applies only remotely to extraterritorial effects of
national activities. The Commission's Sub-Committee on State Respon-
sibility under the chairmanship of Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur, has
abandoned this limited approach and is studying the general aspects of
state responsibility, i.e., the situation resulting from a state's non-fulfillment
of an international legal obligation, regardless of the obligation's nature
and the matter to which it relates. 10
According to the Commission's most recent draft, a state is respon-
sible for internationally wrongful acts or omissions which breach its inter-
national obligations and are attributable to it." Only international law
may characterize an act as wrongful
1 2
An internationally wrongful act, as defined in Art. 3, contains a
subjective and an objective element. 13 The objective element concerns the
act itself, i.e., what degree of pollution breaches the international obliga-
tion of a state.
Is there any customary international law which, in absence of treaty,
would characterize a state's pollution of international watercourses as
wrongful?
There is "extensive State practice, precedent, and doctrine," to use
the language in Art. 15 of the Statutc of the Commission. However, "there
exists no multilateral treaty or convention defining in detail the rights and
obligations of States in the prevention of the pollution of water. A study
of the attitude adopted by international law must therefore rely on dif-
ferent sources, such as treaties concerned with boundary waters or other
watercourses of common interest to several States, international legal prac-
tice, written opinions and views and recommendations adopted by inter-
national bodies."'
4
The Secretary General's earlier Report, Legal Problems Relating to
the Utilization and Use of International Rivers,' 5 lists over 250 treaties
applicable to the non-navigational uses of international rivers. On this
basis, some publicists have declared moot the subject of extraterritorial
injury caused by the pollution of international rivers.16 While this posi-
tion is academically tenable, it is speculative.
Numerous treaties with pollution provisions, mostly involving Euro-
pean and North American states, merely evidence the general principle
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.1
7
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No international commission established to administer an internation-
al watercourse possesses judicial power to enforce, police, or award com-
pensation due to fault of a signatory. Compensation, usually obtained
through the co-operative association of the international commission mem-
bers, implies no admission of responsibility in a judicial sense. Although*
the state practice of many nations demonstrates a repeated pattern of com-
pliance with commission recommendations, this does not change the "volun-
tarily adopted" action of states into acts of obligatory compliance. The
numerous international commissions are confined to investigation and re-
commendation. Supernational Environmental Control Agencies' 8 and sur-
render of compulsory jurisdiction to any tribunal are not predictable, 19
since states fear adjudication or compulsory arbitration of disputes aris-
ing out of the important use of water resources in the national interest.
20
Geographically, sixty states21 qualify as "basin" states.22 Many ba-
sins 23 are not subjects to any agreement. Existent treaties do not make
pollution a recognized legal cause of action between signatories. 24 The
customary law regulating the pollution of international watercourses is
undeveloped3 5 There is no application of the law that some publicists and
associations say exists. There are a few international cases in analogous
situations 26 and a large number of multilateral treaties, but the principles
embodied in them do not bind non-party states by operation of custom.
They have no obligatory effect on non-signatories which Art. 2 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines as third states.
27
What is the legal effect of the relevant treaties which exist?
The role played by custom in sometimes extending the application
of rules contained in a treaty beyond the contracting states is
well recognized. A treaty concluded between certain states may
formulate a rule, or establish a territorial, fluvial or maritime
regime which afterwards comes to be generally accepted by other
'States as customary international law, as for example the Hague
Conventions regarding the rules of land warfare.
2 8
This process is not restricted to law-making treaties. When it occurs,
custom binds third states who are not parties to such treaties. The treaties
themselves have no effect on third states. According to Art. 38 of the
Vienna Convention on the law of treaties: "Nothing precludes a rule set
forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a customary
rule of international law, recognized as such." 29 However, the principles
embodied in treaties relevant to the pollution of international watercourses
are not so recognized at this time.
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Is a third state required to refrain from activity within its territory
which might result in pollution and cause territorial injury? The general
rule is that parties to a treaty cannot impose an obligation on a third
state without its consent, pacta tertiis nec nocent ne prosunt3 0 A treaty
binds a third state only if the parties intend to apply it to third states, and
if the third state expressly agrees. 31 These rules may not answer the ques-
tion if the treaties concerned have "objective" effects, or create an "objec-
tive regime."
The International Law Commission in its preparatory work on the
Vienna Convention discussed extensively the effect of treaties on third
states. The Commission did rot include treaties which have "objective ef-
fects" and provide for "objective regimes" in their final draft. This is
most unfortunate, since the treaties providing for the non-navigational uses
of international watercourses may be in this category. If so, these treaties
have greater authority to place obligations on third states than regular
multilateral or bilateral treaties.
32
Every treaty establishes a contractual relationship between the parties.
In this sense, all treaties establish a kind of "international regime." How-
ever, the question of "objective effects" truly arises only in regard to a
special type of treaty. 33 Art. 23 of the Commission's preliminary draft on
the Law of Treaties defines this class of treaty.34
The parties must intend to create a regime for the general interest
in a particular river or region. This river or region must be subject to the
territorial competence of one or more of them, but need not include all
such states. 35 Treaties on the non-navigational uses of international water-
courses meet these criteria.
Treaties which create objective regimes differ from law-making
treaties. No state has greater competence than any other in the subject
matter of most law making treaties. 36 River treaties deal with states pos-
sessing special competence due to geographical position in a region where
the subject matter is located. Are treaties which include pollution articles
and which establish a regime for the non-navigational use of international
watercourses in this category?
Sir Humphrey Waldoch, Special Rapporteur for the Commission on
the Law of Treaties, asserts that "the mere fact that certain provisions of
a treaty may constitute an objective regime does not mean that they are
to be regarded as independent of the rest of the treaty. ' 37 If the corrol-
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lary of this is true, then pollution provisions included in treaties on the
navigation of international rivers have the same character as the general
treaty.
According to the International Law Commission, treaties providing
for the freedom of navigation in international rivers are treaties creating
"objective regimes." 38 Treaties relevant to the pollution of international
rivers have their inception in, and have evolved from, pollution articles
in treaties on navigational use.
Many modern uses of international watercourses were unknown dur-
ing the initial development of the law pertaining to the use of international
rivers. 39 Since navigation was the principle use of such rivers, the riparian
doctrine 40 and the doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty, 41 which
are fundamental to establish state responsibility for extraterritorial pollu-
tion injury, were first applied to states in the area of navigational use.42
Prior to World War I, navigational use was of such importance that inter-
national law did not recognize non-navigable rivers flowing through more
than one state as subjects of international concern.
In referring to international watercourses, the Final Act of Congress
of Vienna adopted the phrase "Navigable rivers or streams which separate
or traverse several states. '43 The same phrase was used in the Treaty of
Paris of 1856. 4 4 Navigation continued to be the dominant concern 45
through the middle and latter half of the nineteenth century. 46
The emergence of non-navigational uses began around 1890 when
states enacted various treaties with specific provisions to protect fishing.47
Such treaties had pollution provisions, but only as a secondary feature.
The term "International Rivers" appears initially in the 1919-1920
Peace Treaties. In this context the term applied only to the navigable sec-
tions of rivers which offered more than one state access to the sea.4 In
1929, the Permanent Court of International Justice upheld this definition
in the River Oder case.49 The 1921 Barcelona Statute, although adopting
the term "navigable waterways of international concern," emphasized the
growing importance of uses other than navigation. 50 Two years later, the
Convention Relating to the Development of Hydroelectric Power Affecting
More Than One State further demonstrated the new importance of non-
navigational uses.
51
The treaties relevant to the pollution of international rivers and to
non-navigational uses, because of their nature and evolution, are treaties
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
which create objective regimes. The question of local or particular custom
is especially important if these treaties create "objective regimes."5 2 Such
treaties by their nature attempt to create a regional custom which may
differ from general custom.
The development of state responsibility for extraterritorial injury
"depends on further inroads being made on some of the principles sur-
rounding state sovereignty."5 3 General principles embodied in treaties on
the use of international rivers imply such inroads, but these principles are
not generally accepted to the extent that they mandatorily bind third states
according to the force of general custom.5 4 Is this also true of local custom
as regards third states sharing the same geographic region?
Although the Right of Passage case55 and the Asylum case5 6 hold dif-
ferently, the International Law Commission has asserted that local custom
binds third states in the same operational manner as general custom, and
does not require express consent of the third state.
57
The pollution of international watercourses is uniquely suited to a
local custom and objective regime approach. No uniform international pol-
lution standard is possible, other than a vague one, because of the physical
and climatic differences throughout the world.58
If the Commission produces an acceptable convention on state respon-
sibility, it will define an internationally wrongful act and its ramifications.
Since such criteria would apply to pollution which causes extraterritorial
injury, a special inquiry into this area under the topic of non-navigational
uses is redundant. Extraterritorial injury, regardless of cause, is a subset
of general state responsibility. Art. X and X159 of the Helsinki Rules deal
specifically with extraterritorial pollution injury, but fail to define precise-
ly a uniform international pollution standard.
The Helsinki Rules, and the Council of Europe Draft Convention of
1969 prohibit "pollution... causing or likely to cause substantial injury
in the territory of any other contracting State." 60 What is a "substantial
injury?"
According to the International Law Association's Comment to Art. X
of the Helsinki Rules "an injury is considered substantial if it materially
interferes with or prevents reasonable use of the water. '61 The comment
further defines material interference as action not in accord with equitable
utilization. According to Art. IV of the Helsinki Rules, equitable utiliza-
tion entitles a basin state to "a reasonable and equitable share in the
beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin. '62 None
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of this circuitous verbiage defines the degree of injury which renders a
state responsible.63 The Helsinki Rules merely restate the principle sic
utere tuo.
This principle is too vacuous. It does not impose obligations on third
states according to general international custom.6 4 Thus, third state viola-
tion of the principle is not an internationally wrongful act. The possible
exception is an objective regime treaty which may establish local custom
for third states.
State practice, as reflected in treaties, demonstrates no obligatory
compliance with the principle sic utere tuo.
There is a long history of treaties proscribing pollution of interna-
tional watercourses. However, a study of them does not reveal a uniform
international standard of pollution injury rendering another state respon-
sible for such acts.65 Some merely provide for mutual concern over re-
sources or mention pollution as something the parties must take reasonable
steps to avoid. Others prohibit certain effects of pollution. Most treaties
refer conflicts to a non-judicial international commission. 6
6
In 1909, the United States enacted a treaty with Great Britain, repre-
senting Canada, concerning the boundary waters and Great Lakes between
the United States and Canada. It typifies the treaties establishing inter-
national commissions and relating to the non-navigational use of interna-
tional watercourses. According to Art. IV, "Waters flowing across the
boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of health or
property on the other." However, both countries disclaimed responsibility
for extraterritorial injury.
67
The treaty established the International Joint Commission which has
"come to be regarded with some degree of envy by other nations con-
fronted by problems of international river development. ' '6" Such praise
is suspect since the International Joint Commission is primarily involved
in investigation and research. It must wait until one of the parties requests
it to investigate a problem. In addition, according to Art. IX, the "reports
of the Commission shall not be regarded as decisions of the question or
matter so submitted, either on the facts or the law and shall in no way
have the character of an arbitral award. 6 9
State practice between the United States and Canada during the last
sixty years renders evidence of an opposite nature. Both countries have
refrained from taking action without Commission authorization.70 Their
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compliance with recommendations indicates their unofficial judicial ef-
fect. 7' This dichotomy between the lack of judicial power and the record
of conformity with Commission recommendations testifies to the excellent
cooperation between the states, but to nothing more. Despite contrary prac-
tice, the treaty is "opposed to the concept of an international body with
administrative and enforcement functions." 72 Because the parties officially
deny responsibility for extraterritorial injury, adherence to the principle
see utere tuo is not obligatory.
The treaties on pollution and non-navigational uses of international
watercourses inherently reflect the primary concerns of the geographic re-
gion where the resources are located. Thus, except for a general incorpora-
tion of sec utere tuo, there is little uniformity. This is the primary reason
why local custom and regional agreements are more suitable than an inter-
national convention.
At least a study of the treaties reveals a similar approach among
states of diverse political orientation and ideological differences. 73 Such
unity would probably continue in the area of cooperative non-navigational
use, but would certainly break down on the question of state responsibility,
considering the disagreement between communist and western states in
this area. 74
The situation surrounding the United States testing of a hydrogen
bomb on Eniwetok Atoll in the Pacific in 1954 demonstrates the general
practice of states in the area of state responsibilities for extraterritorial
injury.
On March 1, 1954 the United States exploded a hydrogen bomb in
the Marshall Islands. The test resulted in injuries to Japanese fishermen,
and destroyed over 175 tons of fish, disrupting the Japanese market.
75
In January 1955, the United States gave monetary compensation to
the Japanese government but stated that:
The Government of the United States of America has made clear
that it is prepared to make monetary compensation as an addi-
tional expression of its concern and regret over the injuries sus-
tained .... The United States of America hereby tenders, ex
gratia, to the Government of Japan, without reference to the
question of legal liability, the sum of two million dollars for pur-
poses of compensation for the injuries or damages sustained as a
result of nuclear tests in the Marshall Islands in 1954...
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It is the understanding of the Government of the United States
of America that the Government of Japan, in accepting the
tendered sum of two million dollars, does so in full settlement of
any and all claims against the United States of America or its
agents, nationals, or judicial entities on the part of Japan and its
nationals and juridical entities for any and all injuries, losses, or
damages arising out of the said nuclear tests.
76
The practice of the United States in this instance is representative of
practice generally in this area, since the United States in making repara-
tion, declared explicitly that it did so ex gratia and not as a matter of
legal liability.
The Helsinki Rules adopt a broad scope, encompassing utilization of
river basin resources as well as reparation for injury. This is too expan-
sive for realistic codification. The Commission would avoid future prob-
lems if it restricted its inquiry to non-navigational uses and included
extraterritorial injury caused by pollution of international rivers in its
attempted codification of general state responsibility.
The codification of the law of international rivers, to interpret Art.
13 of the Charter and Statute of the Commission, includes both codifica-
tion and development of the law. 77 The Commission must not confine it-
self to simple exposition of existing law. The question most relevant to
the Helsinki Rules and to the Commission's task is: How far may develop-
mental efforts go before such progressive activity becomes self-defeating?
Also, at what point must the Commission stop to avoid sacrificing the
potential agreement of states in the cause of development?
The Commission has already stated that the Helsinki Rules are too
academic and Utopian.
78
Private codification is less complex and less restrictive than the Com-
mission's official codification. 79 Commission codification is an interna-
tional effort to secure eventual state acceptance in the form of an inter-
national convention. Thus, the Commission must exercise caution in de-
velopmental areas. Codification is intricate and time consuming. Art. 23
of the Statute of the Commission requires the following preliminary stages
enroute to codification. First, the Commission must prepare a report and
submit it to the General Assembly. Second, the General Assembly must
pass a resolution adopting the report. Third, the General Assembly must
recommend that its members adopt the report in the form of a Conven-
tion, or that the United Nations convene a conference to conclude a con-
vention.
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A draft convention on international watercourses would be more
readily acceptable if the convention avoided the controversial area of state
responsibility for extraterritorial injury caused by pollution.
The subjective element in Art. 380 of the Commission's latest draft
on state responsibility asks whether a wrongful act is attributable to the
state. Art. 581 and 682 provide that Acts and Commissions of state or-
gans, whether executive, legislative, or administrative, are attributable to
a state. However, most activities polluting international rivers and caus-
ing extraterritorial injury are private acts within a state. According to
the general rule, acts by private parties do not result in state respon-
sibility.83
Art. X of the Helsinki Rules adopts the position of direct state respon-
sibility for all pollution "originating within a territory of state" which
would cause substantial injury. In this regard, the rules make no distinc-
tion between public and private activities.
8 4
Acts of omission are particularly important in attributing private
polluting acts within state territory to the state. The Corfu Channel case,
and the Trail Smelter Case are specially significant because they lay the
foundation for such attribution.
In October 1946 two British naval vessels struck mines while sailing
through the Corfu Channel resulting in serious personal injuries includ-
ing loss of life to some personnel on board, destruction of one ship, and
serious damage to the other. The incident occurred in Albanian territorial
waters. Albania had not laid the minefield, but Albania had not warned
the British ships of its existence. The state referred the case to the Inter-
national Court of Justice. The court held that Albania was responsible
for the injury because it is "every State's obligation not to allow know-
ingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
States. 85 This statement by the Court is the major basis for asserting that
a state is obliged to refrain from acts which may cause extraterritorial
injury.
8 6
The main issue in the case which concerns us is the attribution of a
wrongful act, resulting in state responsibility, to Albania. The crucial mat-
ter is the imputation of knowledge to Albania which the Court held as an
adequate basis for state responsibility. This case establishes the tenet that
insufficient efforts on the part of a state to keep informed of conditions
which may result in injury to other states is sufficient basis for respon-
sibility.
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The British alleged that the injury had been caused by mines which
formed part of a minefield laid in the Channel with the knowledge of Al-
bania. Albania denied such knowledge. In finding that Albania did have
knowledge, the Court held that the minefield's location within the Albanian
territorial sea was not in itself sufficient to prove knowledge. "This fact
by itself and apart from other circumstances neither involves prima facie
responsibility nor shifts the burden of proof."87 However, the Court found
it difficult to believe that a mine field could have been laid in Albanian
territorial waters without Albania's detection. Consequently Albania either
had actual knowledge, founded on circumstantial evidence, or had failed
to exercise proper vigilance within its territory.
88
There are elements of this case which weaken its invocation to sup-
port state responsibility for extraterritorial injury. The most glaring fault
is that the injury occurred in Albanian territory. Therefore, it is in line
with the scope of the Commission's earlier work on state responsibility
regarding injuries to aliens. The case involved two governments. There-
fore, it may not be as applicable to private parties suffering extraterritorial
injury caused by a state's failure to exercise proper vigilance, and even
less so in similar cases between two private parties of different states. How-
ever, the case does establish a basis to hold a state responsible for extra-
territorial injury caused by the pollution of international rivers, if the
injurious activity occurred within state territory due to insufficient super-
vision of such activity by the agencies of the state.
The Trail Smelter Case is the only case dealing with extraterritorial
injury caused by pollution. An ad hoc tribunal composed of representa-
tives from Belgium, United States and Canada rendered the judgement in
1941. The United States alleged that air pollution from a privately owned
smelter plant located in Canada had caused damage in the state of Wash-
ington. The Tribunal held that:
- ..under the principle of international law, as well as the law of
the United States no state has the right to use or permit the use
of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in
or to the territory of another or the properties of persons therein,
when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence.8 9
This holding is of questionable importance, since the dispute was sub-
mitted to the tribunal on the basis of a special convention.90 Under this
convention, Canada voluntarily accepted state responsibility for private
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
conduct occurring within its territory. However, this case is still of special
importance because the tribunal declared Canada responsible under inter-
national law and "[alpart from" the convention.9 1
This holding is opposed to the general rule that a state is not re-
sponsible for the acts of private individuals. 92 In this case both states
voluntarily assumed an entirely private claim. The United States espoused
the injuries to its citizens as injuries to its territory, and Canada voluntarily
assumed liability for private acts within its territory. Such voluntary
assumption and the holding of the Tribunal does not change customary
international law in the area of state responsibility. It does, however,
supply evidence to support the position that a state is responsible for
extraterritorial injury 'by pollution originating within its territory even
if the activity if privately conducted.
It may be convenient, in 'conclusion, to summarize briefly the sub-
missions of this article:
1. The area of non-navigational uses, as generally defined, is
rampant with problems similar to those encountered at the unsuccessful
Hague Conference of 1930, since it includes state responsibility for extra-
territorial injury caused 'by the pollution of international rivers.
2. Numerous treaties with pollution provisions merely evidence the
general principle sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.93 They have no
obligatory effect on non-signatories.
3. The treaties relevant to the pollution of international rivers and
to non-navigational uses, because of their nature and evolution, are treaties
which create objective regimes. They have greater authority to bind third
states than most multilateral treaties.
4. The pollution of international watercourses is uniquely suited to
a local custom and objective regime approach. No uniform international
pollution standard is possible, other than a vague one, because of the
physical and climatic differences throughout the world.
5. If the Commission produces an acceptable convention on state
responsibility, it will define an internationally wrongful act and its
ramifications. Since such criteria would apply to pollution which causes
extra-territorial injury, a special inquiry into this area under the topic
of non-navigational uses is redundant.
6. State practice demonstrates no obligatory compliance with the
principle sic utere tuo.
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7. The Helsinki Rules adopt a broad scope, encompassing utilization
of river basin resources as well as reparation for injury. This is too
expansive for realistic codification. The Commission would avoid future
problems if it restricted its inquiry to non-navigational uses, and included
extraterritorial injury caused by pollution of international rivers in its
attempted codification of general state responsibility. Pollution is not
a use, but a result of use. A draft convention on international water-
courses would be more readily acceptable if the convention avoided the
controversial area of state responsibility for extraterritorial injury caused
by pollution.
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Law Quarterly 1, at II and 31 (1972).
17 Use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another.
• . .Various comments have been made on this maxim: "Mere verbiage";
El. B. &. E. 643. "No help to decision"; L.R. 2 Q.B. 247. "Utterly useless
as a legal maxim"; 9 N.Y. 445 It is a mere begging of the question; it
assumes the very point in controversy. 13 Lea 507. See 2 Aust. Jurisp. 795,
829. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1551 (4th ed. 1951).
l8Kennan, To Prevent a World Wasteland: A Proposal, 48 Foreign Affairs 401
(1970). Reprinted 1 Environmental Affairs 191 (1971). No express jurisdiction has
ever been granted to an international commission. Report of the Fiftieth Conference
of the International Law Association Held at Brussels 417-418 (1962).
t t jordan, Recent Developments in International Environmental Pollution. Con-
trol, 15 McGill L.J. 300; Garretson et al., supra note 5, at 145.
2 0 Laylin and Bianchi, The Role of Adjudication in International River Disputes,
53 A. J. Int'l L. 30 (1950).
2 tJohnson, Effects of Existing Uses on Equitable Apportionment of International
Rivers, 1 U. Brit. Columbia L.R. 389 at 391 (1960).
22Art. III "A 'basin State' is a state the territory of which includes a portion
of an international drainage basin." The Helsinki Rules Garretson et al., supra note
5, at 781.
23Art. III "An international drainage basin is a geographical area extending
over two or more States determined by the watershed limits of the system of waters,
including surface and underground waters, flowing into a common terminus."
Helsinki Rues, reprinted in Garretson et al., supra note 5, at 780. This treatment
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paralells the physical structure of international watercourses. It is more functional
than the traditional riparian doctrine, since it is better suited to non-navigational
uses. The basin concept operates according to the principle of coherence which
treats watercourses as an integral whole. See Report of the Forty-Eighth Conference
of the International Law Association Held at New York ppv-ix (1958).
2 4Cano, Preliminary Review of Questions Relating to the Development of In-
ternational River Basins in Latin America, U.N. ECOSOC Council Report Economic
Commission for Latin America, 8th Sess. (1959), U.N. Doc. E/CN.12/511 at p. 13
(1959); See also Kenworthy, Joint Development of International Rivers, 54 Am. J.
Int'l L. 952 (1960); Goldie, International Law and the Development of International
River Basins, 1 U. Brit. Columbia L.R. 763, 765 (1963).
2 5Lester, Pollution, in Garretson et al. supra note 5, at 94.
2 61n using these few cases note that "The decision of the Court has no binding
force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case." Article 59,
Statute of the International Court of Justice. There is no Stare Decisis in interna-
tional law. Prior cases are only persuasive evidence. See Schwarzenberger, A Man-
ual of International Law 37, 255 (1967).
2 7Art. 2 "(h) 'third state' means a State not a party to the treaty" Vienna
Convention on the Law of the Treaties, in Brownlie, Basic Documents in Interna-
tional Law 234 (1972).
2 SInt'l L. Comm'n Report, The Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/L. 116/Add.
4 pp. 25 (1966).
2 9"Art. 38: Rules in a treaty becoming binding on third states through inter-
national custom." "Nothing . . . precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming
binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law, recognized as
such." Vienna Convention, supra note 27, at 247.
3 OWaldock, (Third) Report on the Law of Treaties, 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 18,





TREATIES PROVIDING FOR OBJECTIVE REGIMES
1. A treaty establishes an objective regime when it appears from its terms
and from the circumstances of its conclusion that the intention of the parties
is to create in the general interest general obligations and rights relating
to a particular region, State, territory, locality, river, waterway, or to a
particular area of sea, sea-bed, or air-space; provided that the parties in-
clude among their number any State having territorial competence with
reference to the subject-matter of the treaty, or that any such State has con-
sented to the provision in question.
2. (a) A State not a party to the treaty, which expressly or impliedly
consents to the creation or to the application of an objective regime, shall
be considered to have accepted it.
(b) A State not a party to the treaty, which does not protest against, or
otherwise manifest its opposition to the regime within a period of X years
of the registration of the treaty with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, shall be considered to have impliedly accepted the regime.
3. A State which has accepted a regime of the kind referred to in para-
graph 1 shall be-
(a) bound by any general obligations which it contains; and
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(b) entitled to invoke the provisions of the regime and to exercise any
general right which it may confer, subject to the terms and conditions
of the treaty.
4. Unless the treaty otherwise provides, a regime of the kind referred to in
paragraph 1 may be amended or revoked by the parties to the treaty only
with the concurrence of those States which expressly or impliedly accepted
the regime and have a substantial interest in its functioning.
Id. at 26. (emphasis added).
35Waldock, (Third) Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/167
p. 71 (1964).
3 6Waldock, supra note 31, at 33.
37Waldock, supra note 35, at 78.
38Int'l L. Comm'n, Report, supra note 28, at 25. However, no publicist has at-
tempted to categorize treaties which deal with pollution and the non-navigation uses
of international watercourses as those which create objective regimes. Thus, this
approach has not been used to evaluate the effect of these treaties on third states.
39See Glos, International Rivers 2 (1961); Garretson et al., supra note 5, at 95.
40 The right of territorial sovereignty over an international river entitles
a riparian state to use the river in any manner which will not result in a
material alteration of the river or of its availability for use as it passes
through the other riparian states.
Alstyne, the Justiciability of International River Disputes: A Study in the Case
Method, 14 Duke L.J., 307, 314 (1964). See also, 33 Halsbury's Laws of England
559 (1939).
4 t Just like independence territorial supremacy does not give a boundless
liberty of action . . . a state is, in spite of its territorial supremacy, not
allowed to alter the natural conditions of its own territory to the disadvan-
tage of the natural conditions of the territory of a neighboring state . . .
Oppenheim as cited by Sir Robert Borden, House of Commons Debates, Canada,
IV, Session, lth parliament, 1910-11, Vol. 1, at 903-904.
4 2See O'Connell, 1 International Law 625-627 (1965).
4 3 Final Act of the Congress of Vienna of June 9, 1815, art. 108. Martens, N.R.
II, p. 379.
4 4Treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856, art. 15, Martens, N.R.G. 15, p. 782.
4 5See U.N. Doc. E/ECE/136, p. 26-35 (1952).
4 6Cutler, The International Law of Navigable Rivers 3-4 (1965).
4 7Manner, Water Pollution in International Law, 13 WHO Public Health Papers
57 (1962).
48The Peace Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1919, art. 331, Martens, N.R.G.
3rd. ser. 11, p. 677.
4 9Thc Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River
Oder, (1929) P.C.I.J., Series A., No. 23.
50Statute of the Regime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern an-
nexed to the Convention signed at Barcelona on April 20, 1921, art. 1, 7 L.N.T.S.
p. 51.
51Done at Geneva, December 9, 1923, 36 L.N.T.S. 77; Hudson II International
Legislation 1182 (1931).
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52 See Thirlway, International Customary Law and Codification, 134-142 (1972);
D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law 105-109, 233-264 (1971).
53Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 2 Recueil des Cours
1, at 69 (1962).
54Id. at 50.
55(1960) I.C.J. Rep. 6, at 34.
56(1949) I.C.J. Rep. 266, at 276.
57 Waldock, supra note 30, at 32 and 33.
5 8See the European Agreement on the Restriction of the Use of Certain Deter-
gents in Washing and Cleaning Products for an example of a regional standard
approach, 16 European Y.B. 335 (1968); Cf. Principles 10, 11, 12, 21 and 23 of
the 1972 U.N. Conference on Human Environment, Report of the Conference, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 48/14, 5-7; 11 ILM 1416 (1972); for general comment on Stock-
holm principles see Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment
14 Harvard Int'l L.J. 423 (1973).
59Art. X. 1. Consistent with the principle of equitable utilization of the
waters of an international drainage basin, a state (a) Must prevent any
new form of water pollution or an increase in the degree of existing water
pollution of an international drainage basin, which would cause substantial
injury in the territory of a co-basin State, and (b) Should take all reason-
able measures to abate existing water pollution in an international drainage
basin to such an extent that no substantial damage is caused in the terri-
tory of a co-basin state.
2. The rule stated in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to water pollu-
tion originating within (a) the territory of the state, or (b) outside the
territory of the state, if it is caused by the state's conduct.
Helsinki Rules, Int'l L. Ass'n, supra note 5, at 496-497; Garretson, supra note
5, at 798. (emphasis added) The Committee on International Rivers of the Inter-
national Law Association adopted Principle VII on state responsibility at the 1962
Brussels Conference.
Preventable pollution of water in one State which does substantial injury to
another State renders the former State responsible for the damage done. Brussels
Conference, supra note 18, Principle VII. (emphasis added) This principle was later
expanded and became Art. XI of the Helsinki Rules.
Article XI
1. In the case of a violation of the rule stated in paragraph 1 (a) of
Article X of this Chapter, the State responsible shall be required to cease
the wrongful conduct and compensate the injured co-basin State for the
injury that has been caused to it.
2. In a case falling under the rule stated in paragraph 1 (b) of Article
X, if a State fails to take reasonable measures, it shall be required promptly
to enter in negotiations with the injured State with a view toward reaching
a settlement equitable under the circumstances.
Garretson, supra note 5, at 798.
60d. at 793.
61While there is no uniform international pollution standard or clear definition
of degree of injury incurred to render a state responsible for extraterritorial injury,
proof of material damage is required. See United Kingdom v. Iceland, (1974) ICJ
Rep. 302, 310; see also Legal Problems Relating to Non-navigational Uses of In-
ternational Watercourses U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/274, supra note 2 at 229-30, and
Handl, Territorial Sovereignty and the Problem of Transnational Pollution. 69 Am.
J. Int'l L. 50 at 61 (1975).
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621d. at 782.
63To define injury it might be best to refer to the 1961 Harvard Draft on the
international responsibility of States for injuries to aliens. Art. 14: 1. An "injury"
. . . is a loss or detriment caused to an alien by a wrongful act or omission
which is attributable to a State.
2. Injuries with the meaning .. . include, but are not limited to
(a) bodily or mental harm
(b) loss sustained by an alien as the result of the death of another alien
(c) deprivation of liberty
(d) harm to reputation
(e) destruction of, damage to, or loss of property
(f) destruction of use or enjoyment of property
(g) deprivation of means of livelihood
(h) loss or deprivation of enjoyment of rights under a contract or con-
cession; or
(i) any loss or detriment against which an alien is specifically protected by
a treaty.
3. An injury is "caused" . . . by an act or omission if the loss or detriment
suffered by the injured alien is the direct consequence of that act or omission.
4. Any injury is not "caused" by an act or omission:
(a) if there was no reasonable relation between the facts which made the act
or omission wrongful and the loss or detriment suffered by the injured alien; or
(b) if, in the case of an act or omission creating an unreasonble risk of in-
jury, the loss or detriment suffered by the injured alien occured outside the scope
of the risk.
2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 148 (1969). See also Garcia Amador, Responsibility of
The State for Injuries Caused in its Territory to the Person or Property of Aliens-
Reparation of the Injury, 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 8-11 (1961), U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/134 para. 29-50 (1961). The International Joint Commission produced the
best available general criteria in 1918. The I.J.C., when considering injury caused
by pollution "regards the word injury when used in the reference or treaty as hav-
ing as a special significance--one somewhat akin to the term 'injuria' in jurispru-
dence. It does not mean harm or damage but harm or damage which the sufferer,
in view of all the circumstances of the case, and of all the co-existence rights and
of the paramount importance of human health and life, should reasonably be called
upon to bear." I.J.C. report of Sept. 10, 1918.
64"The term 'practice' is used to indicate the aggregation of steps which are
formative of law, whereas the term 'custom' is reserved for the law itself...
Only when a tradition of acting is followed under the conviction that it must be
followed is it of significance in the evolution of international law; when the tradi-
tion is common to a large number of States it is described as the 'practice of na-
tions' In this sense the word 'practice' is descriptive of the fact of an aggregation
of juridically significant acts. The word 'custom' stands for the proposition that the
practice is actually productive of law. Admittedly there is only a shade of distinction
between the two words, but they are not synonyms; the one is rather the obverse of
the other, 'practice' being suggestive of the formative process, 'custom' of its com-
pletion. Perhaps it may be said that 'practice' is evidence of the act of creation,
'custom' is the result." O'Connell, supra note 42, at 9.
65The 1922 Treaty between Germany and Denmark in Art. 45 provides that
"If refuse or harmful substances are discharged into any watercourse . . . the per-
sons who suffer damage thereby are entitled to appeal to the Fronticr Water
Commission." 10 L.N.T.S. 73, 187, 225 (1922).
In 1934 the agreement between the Belgian Government and Great Britain
regarding the Water Rights on the Boundary between Tanganyka and Ruanda
Urundi, signed at London, 22 Nov. 1934, 190 L.N.T.S. 103, 104 (1938), prohibits
any industrial activity "which may pollute or cause the deposit of any poisonous,
noxious or polluting substance in the water."
The 1952 Agreement between Poland and the German Democratic Republic
Concerning Navigation on Frontier Waters and the Use and Maintenance of Fron-
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tier Waters, Art. 17, Signed at Berlin, 6 Feb. 1952, 304 U.N.T.S. 131, prohibits
introduction of effluents which might "affect adversely the use of water of said river
for domestic requirements, water supply, industry and agriculture." (emphasis added)
The Agreement between the Czechoslovak Republic and Poland Concerning
the Use of Water Resources in Frontier Waters Art. 3, signed at Prague 21 March
1958, 538 U.N.T.S. 108 at 110, obliges the parties to keep the waters "clean to such
extent as is specifically determined in each particular case in accordance with the
economic and technical possibilities and requirements of the contracting parties."
(emphasis added)
Germany became a party to four agreements concerned with pollution between
1956 and 1960. The treaties require the parties "To prevent such excessive pollution
of the boundary waters as may substantially impair the customary use of the waters
by the neighboring states." Treaty between the Netherlands and Germany for the
Settlement of Frontier Questions, Art. 58, signed at The Hague, 8 April 1960, 508
U.N.T.S. 14 at 190. (emphasis added)
Art. IV of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty provides that
Each party declares its intention to prevent as far as practicable, undue
pollution of the waters of the rivers which might affect adversely uses
similar in nature to those to which the waters were put on the Effective
Date and agrees to take all reasonable measures to ensure that, before any
sewerage or industrial waste is allowed to flow into the Rivers, it will be
treated, where necessary, in such manner as not materially to affect those
uses. Provided that the criterion of reasonableness shall be the customary
practice in similar situations on the Rivers. Indus Waters Treaty, Art. IV
(10) 419 U.N.T.S. 125, 138-140. (emphasis added)
The Agreement between Finland and the U.S.S.R. Concerning Frontier Water-
courses Art. 4, signed at Helsinki on 24 April 1964, 537 U.N.T.S. 255, prohibits
pollution that "might cause .. .harmful changes in the composition of the water,
damage to the fish-stock or substantial scenic deterioration, or might endanger
public health or have similar harmful consequences for the population or the
economy." (emphasis added)
The agreement between Poland and the U.S.S.R. Concerning the Use of Water
Resources in Frontier Waters Art. 12, signed at Warsaw, 17 July 1964, 538 U.N.T.S.
194, requires the parties to "employ appropriate procedures for suitably purifying
sewerage . . . which may cause harmful pollution of frontier waters." (emphasis
added)
The Agreement Concerning the Niger River Commission and the Navigation
and Transport on the River Niger, Art. 12, done at Niamey, 25 Nov. 1964, 587
U.N.T.S. 19, provides that riparian states will "abstain from carrying out any works
likely to pollute the waters, or any modification likely to affect biological character-
istics of its fauna and flora, without adequate notice to and prior consultation with
the Commission." (emphasis added). See also Legal Problems Relating to the Utili-
zation and Use of International Rivers, U.N. Doc. A/5409 pp. 83, 138, 234, 244, 245,
259, 266, 277, 281, 292, 425, 438, 461, 467, (15 April 1963).
The notice requirement in the Niger River Treaty is based upon the holding in
the Lake Lanoux Arbitration.
The Lake Lanoux Arbitration is also of special importance because it refers
to extraterritorial injury caused by pollution and indicates that such injury may be
an internationally wrongful act.
It could have been argued that the works would bring about a definite pollution
of the waters of the Carol or that the returned waters would have a chemical com-
position or a temperature or some other characteristic which would injure Spanish
interests. Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), 24 Int'l L. Rep. 101, 123
(1957).
6 6Glos, supra note 39, at 100.
67 Boundary Waters Treaty with Great Britain, "Jan. 1909, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S.
No. 548 at 2450.
68The International Joint Commission, 72 Can. Geog. 76, 79-80 (1966).
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69 Supra note 67 at 2452.
7O1d. at 2450.
7"Id. at 2452.
72 See Heeney, Diplomacy With a Difference, IMCO Mag., Oct. 1966, at 22.
7 3Lester, Pollution, in Garretson et al., supra note 5, at 108, 109; Compare
Tunkin, Das Volkerrecht Der Gegenwart 125, 126-127 (Wolf Trans. 1963) with
Waldock supra note 53, at 55, and Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind 106 (1958).
74 See generally Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law 152-153
(Cambridge, 1959).
7 5See Margolis, The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and International Law, 64
Yale L.J. 629, 637-39 (1955), and McDougal and Shlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests
in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64 Yale L.J. 648, 650-53 (1955).
7632 Dep't State Bull. 90-91 (1955); On ex gratia reparation see generally
Garcia Amador, sUpra note 63, at 4 and Goldie, Liability for Damage and the
Progressive Development of International Law, 14 Int'l. and Comp. L.Q. 1189,
1231-1233 (1965).
77E. Lauterpacht, Law of Diplomatic Immunity, 15 The Grotius Society 66
(1955).
7 8Int'l L. Comm'n Y.B. supra note 2, at 279.
79 See Ago, supra note 4, at 135.




3See Whiteman 8 Digest of International Law 808-819 (1967).
t4 lnt'l L. Ass'n, Comments on Art. X, in Garretson, supra note 5, at 797. See
generally Manner, Water Pollution in International Law, The Rights and Obligations
of States Concerning Pollution of Inland Waters and Enclosed Seas, United Nations
Conference on Water Pollution Problems in Europe, Geneva, 1961, Documents Sub-
mitted to the Conference, Vol. II, pp. 446-450 (61. II E/m.m.24)
85(1949) I.C.J. Rep. 4, 22.
86According to the Nambia decision (1971) ICJ Rep 12, 54 para. 118, physical
control of the territory is the basis of liability for extraterritorial injury.
87 Corfu, supra note 85, at 18.
88ld. at 44.
89Trial Smelter, 3 Int'l Arb. Awards, 1963 (1949); 35 Am. J. Int'l L. 716 (1941).
90Convention with the Dominion of Canada relative to the establishment of a
tribunal to decide questions of indemnity and future regime arising from the opera-
tion of smelter at Trial, British Columbia, 15 April 1935, 49 Stat. 3245 (1935),
T.S. 893 (effective 3 Aug. 1935).
9 tConsidering the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal holds that the
Dominion of Canada is responsible in international law for the conduct
of the Trial Smelter. Apart from the undertakings in the Convention; it
'is therefore a duty of the Government of the Dominion of Canada to see to it
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that this conduct should be in conformity with the obligation of the Do-
minion under international law as herein determined.
Trial Smelter Arbitration, preamble, para. 3, 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965-1966
(1941) 35 Am. J. Int'l L. 684, 716-717 (1941) (emphasis added)
9 2 See Bleicher, supra note 16, at 21.
9 3 "Use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another."
Supra note 17.
